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FREE EXERCISE: NEUTRALITY, ANIMUS AND A BREATH OF
LIFE INTO SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to Locke v. Davey,' modem Free Exercise jurisprudence con-
sisted of two contextual poles. At one pole, a neutral criminal statute
prohibiting the use of peyote that incidentally affected religion was up-
held under a rational-basis review in Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.2 Conversely, at the other pole,
a reactionary prohibition of animal sacrifices, directed toward the reli-
gious practices of a specific group, was invalidated under strict scrutiny
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.3 The doc-
trine left uncertain the appropriate standard of review-rational-basis or
strict scrutiny-for a contextual middle-ground between the two poles.
Davey rid Free Exercise jurisprudence of this uncertainty and elucidated
an appropriate standard of review for a non-neutral provision that is less
hostile to religion than the challenged law in Lukumi.4
Ostensibly, Davey split the distance between the existing contextual
poles by introducing an animus distinction, distinguishing benign dis-
criminatory intent from animus.5 Having created this new category,
Davey applied a rational-basis review to a non-neutral law because the
law evinced no animus toward religion.6 Yet, there appears to be a sub-
surface battleground in Davey that reintroduces an erstwhile doctrine to
the forefront of modem Free Exercise jurisprudence.7 This Comment
argues that: (1) Davey represents a resuscitation of a substantial burden
test that, combined with the modem intent test of Smith and Lukumi, pro-
vides a comprehensive Free Exercise doctrine; (2) the animus distinction
introduced in Davey may be problematic as a doctrinal tool; and (3) the
animus distinction is unnecessary because the outcome of Davey hinges
on a substantial burden consideration.
Part H of this Comment provides a background and explanation of
Washington's challenged Promise Scholarship Program, along with its
effect on Joshua Davey. Part El reviews the development of Free Exer-
cise jurisprudence prior to Davey, first surveying the historic substantial
1. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
2. 494 U.S. 872, 888-90 (1990).
3. 508 U.S. 520, 545-46 (1993).
4. See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1314-15 (2004) (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 520
(1993)).
5. See id. at 1315.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 1312-13 (discussing the effect of the Promise Scholarship Program on Joshua
Davey).
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burden inquiry and then surveying the modem intent approach. In Part
IV, this Comment discusses the procedural history of Davey in the fed-
eral courts. This discussion reviews arguments made by the parties and
rationales used by both the majority and dissenting opinions in federal
court.
Part V of this Comment provides a comprehensive analysis of the
Davey decision and its contribution to Free Exercise jurisprudence. First,
the analysis outlines six conceptual categories of Free Exercise chal-
lenges and discusses the appropriate standard of review for each cate-
gory. This discussion demonstrates that the "effect" inquiry reintroduced
in Davey is necessary, combined with an "intent" inquiry, to account for
all Free Exercise circumstances. Next, the analysis argues that there are
potential pitfalls associated with an animus distinction. Finally, the
analysis proposes an approach to Free Exercise challenges called the
"intent/effect" test that considers both the intent and effect of a chal-
lenged law. The proposed approach achieves the doctrinal goals of
Davey while circumventing the precarious distinction between animus
and non-animus discrimination.
II. FACTS
In 1999, the Washington State Legislature found that students who
were successful in their high school pursuits may not have the financial
means to obtain higher education because of difficulty in securing finan-
cial aid and the potential insufficiency of that financial aid.8 Because the
legislature found that "increasingly, an individual's economic viability is
contingent on postsecondary educational opportunities," it sought to de-
velop a state program that would assist higher education students.9 To
achieve that goal, the legislature enacted the Promise Scholarship Pro-
gram, available to students who met the "academic, income, and enroll-
ment requirements."' The Promise Scholarship provided an eligible
student a once-renewable scholarship to attend Washington higher edu-
cation institutions accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting or-
ganization.'" The scholarship neither distinguished between public and
private nor secular and religious institutions; rather, the scholarship was
8. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B. 119.005 (West 2004).
9. id.
10. Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1307, 1310 (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12)(a)-(g)
(2003)). To be eligible for the Promise Scholarship, a student must meet the following require-
ments: (1) graduate from a Washington high school, and (a) graduate in the top 15% of her class, or
(b) attain a cumulative score of 1200 or better on her first attempt on the Scholastic Assessment Test
I, or (c) attain a cumulative score of 27 or better on her first attempt on the American College Test;
and (2) have a family income less than 135% of the state's median; and (3) enroll in an eligible
postsecondary institution in the state of Washington pursuing any degree other than a degree in
theology. Id. Joshua Davey met these requirements and, thus, was eligible for the Promise Scholar-
ship. Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1310.
11. Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1310 (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(13) (2003)).
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designed to be used at any accredited higher education institution within
the state of Washington.'
2
Joshua Davey graduated from high school in May 1999 and was no-
tified in August 1999 of his eligibility to receive $1,125 from the Prom-
ise Scholarship Program for the upcoming school year.' 3 Davey enrolled
at Northwest College, a private Christian college, to pursue a double
major in pastoral ministries and business management/administration.
14
Required classes for a pastoral ministries major at Northwest College are
taught from the viewpoint that the Bible is foundational and represents
truth, rather than merely a historical and scholarly point of view. 15
Moreover, the pastoral ministries major at Northwest College is "de-
signed to prepare students for a career as a Christian minister.,'
16
In October 1999, Washington's Higher Education Coordinating
Board (HECB) informed financial aid administrators at institutions
throughout the state that students pursuing a degree in theology were not
eligible for the Promise Scholarship.' 7 Each college or university is re-
sponsible for the classification of its programs, and Northwest College
determined that its pastoral ministries major was a degree in theology.18
Thus, the institution could not certify Davey's eligibility as required by
the HECB.19 Davey, faced with a choice of either accepting the scholar-
ship or pursuing the pastoral ministries major, decided to forego the
scholarship to pursue his chosen field of study.
20
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.",2 To provide context to the development of Free Exercise ju-
risprudence, this Comment analyzes the circumstances and rationale of
four often discussed cases that shaped the structure of Free Exercise in-
12. Id.
13. Katie Axtell, Note, Public Funding for Theological Training Under the Free Exercise
Clause: Pragmatic Implications and Theoretical Questions Posed to the Supreme Court in Locke v.
Davey, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 585, 589 (2003).
14. Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1310.
15. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
16. Locke, 299 F.3d at 751.
17. Id. "A 'degree in theology' is not defined in the statute, but, as both parties concede, the
statute simply codifies the State's constitutional prohibition on providing funds to students to pursue
degrees that are 'devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith."' Davey, 124 S. Ct. at
1310; see also WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 (prohibiting the use of State funds to devotional educa-
tion). "There is no dispute that the pastoral ministries degree is devotional and therefore excluded
under the Promise Scholarship Program." Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1310-11.
18. Locke, 299 F.3d at 751; see also Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1310.
19. Locke, 299 F.3d at 751.
20. Id.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2004]
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quiries before Locke v. Davey.2 2  By no means all-encompassing, this
background merely provides a basic review of the underlying Free Exer-
cise issues that will surface in the Supreme Court's consideration of
Davey.
23
A. Sherbert v. Verner
24
The Supreme Court first established "a simple, standard test for
evaluating free exercise claims" in its 1963 decision in Sherbert v.
Verner.2 5  In Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church
was denied unemployment benefits because she was unavailable to work
on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith.26 The South Carolina Em-
ployment Security Commission found that she was ineligible for benefits
because the restriction on her Saturday work availability was equivalent
27
to "fail[ing], without good cause," to accept work when offered.
The Court enunciated a test balancing the protection of the free ex-
28
ercise of religion with the protection of compelling state interests.
First, the Court considered the effect of the law in Sherbert, and held that
forcing an individual to choose between following her religion and for-
feiting benefits inflicts "the same kind of burden upon the free exercise
of religion as would a fine imposed against [her] for her Saturday wor-
ship." Applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that the possibility of
fraudulent claims was insufficient to justify such a substantial burden on
an individual's First Amendment rights.3 °
According to the Sherbert doctrine, once a court determines that a
governmental action imposes a substantial burden on religion, strict scru-
tiny is applied. 31 Under strict scrutiny, a law will be invalidated as un-
constitutional unless the government is able to demonstrate that the ac-
22. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004). See also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S 618 (1978); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see
generally ERWIN CHEMERtNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 12.3 (2d ed.
2002) (providing a general background to the Free Exercise doctrine).
23. See also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(holding that timber harvesting and road construction by the government in an area traditionally used
for religious purposes by Native American Indian tribes did not violate the Free Exercise Clause
because the government was not "prohibiting" the exercise of religion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizing that a state's interest in universal compulsory education was insuffi-
cient to justify interfering with Amish children's religious beliefs by compelling them to attend
school).
24. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
25. Axtell, supra note 13, at 595.
26. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399-401.
27. Id. at 401.
28. Id. at 401-06.
29. Id. at 404.
30. id. at 406. "[1]n this highly sensitive constitutional area, 'only the gravest abuses, endan-
gering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."' Id. (quoting Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
31. Axtell, supra note 13, at 595.
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tion was the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling state
32interest. Thus, the Sherbert doctrine is essentially an effect test, focus-
ing the key inquiry on whether the challenged law imposes a substantial
burden, or a sufficient effect, on religion.33
B. McDaniel v. Paty
34
In McDaniel v. Paty, a Tennessee statute disqualified clergy from
participating in the legislature. 35 Appellant McDaniel, an ordained min-
ister of a Baptist Church, filed candidacy for a position with the constitu-
tional convention. 36 An opposing candidate sued for a declaratory judg-
ment, contending that the Tennessee statute disqualified McDaniel from
serving as a delegate to the convention. 37 The issue before the Supreme
Court was whether the statute barring ministers from serving as delegates
deprived McDaniel "of the right to the free exercise of religion guaran-
teed by the First Amendment.
38
The majority in McDaniel held that the statute prohibiting ministers
from participating as delegates to the constitutional convention did, in-
deed, violate McDaniel' s protected right to the free exercise of religion.39
The majority noted that under the provision, "McDaniel cannot exercise
[his right to be a minister and his right to seek and hold office] simulta-
neously because the State has conditioned the exercise of one on the sur-
render of the other., 40  The majority used the Sherbert analysis to con-
clude that this statute imposed a substantial burden, stating .'[[t]o] con-
dition the availability of benefits [including access to the ballot] upon
this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of [his] reli-
gious faith [by surrendering his religiously impelled ministry] effectively
penalizes the free exercise of [his] constitutional liberties. ' A '  Having
found a substantial burden, the majority applied strict scrutiny and in-
validated the Tennessee statute.42
32. Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and
the General Applicability Requirements, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 851-52 (2001).
33. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
34. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
35. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 620.
36. Id. at 621.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 620.
39. Id. at 629.
40. Id. at 626. The Court noted that "the right to the free exercise of religion unquestionably
encompasses the right to preach, proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions .... " Id.
The Court also mentioned that Tennessee "acknowledges the right of its adult citizens generally to
seek and hold office as legislators or delegates to the state constitutional convention." Id.
41. Id. (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406) (alteration in original).
42. Id. at 628-29. The majority held that Tennessee's interest was not compelling, stating that
there is "no persuasive support for the fear that clergymen in public office will be less careful of
anti-establishment interests or less faithful to their oaths of civil office than their unordained coun-
terparts." Id. at 629.
2004]
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McDaniel supplements the doctrine outlined in Sherbert by once
again applying an effect test and focusing the determinative inquiry on
whether the challenged law imposes a substantial burden on religion.43
McDaniel suggests that a generally available benefit cannot be condi-
tioned on any action or inaction relating to religion.44
C. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith
45
The Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division, De-
partment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith limited the application
of Sherbert and created the modem structure for evaluating Free Exercise
infringement claims. 46 In Smith, the respondents were fired from their
positions with a drug rehabilitation organization after they consumed
peyote at a sacramental ceremony of the Native American Church.47
Subsequently, the respondents were determined to be ineligible for un-
employment benefits by the Employment Division because their em-
ployment discharge resulted from misconduct.4 8 The respondents relied
upon the "compelling state interest" test outlined in Sherbert49 in their
assertion that their religious motivation for the use of peyote placed them
beyond the reach of Oregon's criminal law.
50
The majority in Smith severely limited the Sherbert doctrine, ex-
cepting neutral laws of general applicability from strict scrutiny, even
where there is a substantial burden on religion.5 1 The majority opined
that "incidental effect[s] of. . . generally applicable and otherwise valid
provision[s]," which burden the free exercise of religion do not offend
the Free Exercise Clause.52 In an "attempt[] to cabin [Sherbert's] sig-
nificance somewhere on the musty shelves of history, ' 3 the majority
declined "to breathe into Sherbert [any] life beyond the unemployment
compensation field.,
54
43. See id. at 626.
44. Id.
45. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
46. Colleen Carlton Smith, Zelman's Evolving Legacy: Selective Funding of Secular Private
Schools in State School Choice Programs, 89 VA. L. REV. 1953, 1968 (2003).
47. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (peyote is a controlled substance prohibited by Oregon law); see
OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987).
48. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
49. See generally Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398.
50. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 (."prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' includes requiring any
individual to observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an act
that his religious belief forbids (or requires)") (alteration in original).
51. Axtell, supra note 13, at 595-96.
52. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878; Axtell, supra note 13, at 595-96.
53. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 763 (9th Cir. 2002) (McKeown, J., dissenting), rev'd 124
S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
54. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
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The doctrine developed in Smith denotes a significant shift from the
effect test applied in Sherbert and McDaniel.55  Rather than applying
strict scrutiny to a law that imposes a substantial burden on religion,
Smith declines to consider effect, applying a rational-basis test where a
law is neutral and generally applicable. 56  Thus, the Smith doctrine fo-
cuses on the overall purpose, or intent, of a provision.57 This novel intent
test suggests that the effect inquiry of Sherbert is misplaced and inappli-
cable, instead focusing the determinative inquiry on the neutrality of the
challenged provision.58
D. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah
59
In 1993, the Court affirmed Smith and applied it to a fundamentally
different set of facts, demonstrating the effect the test would have on a
non-neutral and non-generally applicable law.6° In Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Lukumi Babalu Church, whose
members practice the Santeria religion and employ animal sacrifice as a
"principal form[] of devotion," leased land and announced plans to create
a place of worship in the city of Hialeah.6' In response, the city council
held an emergency session and passed an ordinance that prohibited ani-
mal sacrifice.62 Once the city adopted the ordinance, the church filed a
suit alleging that the ordinance was unconstitutional under the Free Exer-
cise Clause.63
The Court made clear that the requirements of neutrality and gen-
eral applicability articulated in Smith continued to apply,64 and any law
that failed to meet those requirements would be subjected to strict scru-
6;5tiny. The Court held that the ordinances were neither neutral nor gen-
55. See Axtell, supra note 13, at 595-96.
56. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 ("The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibi-
tions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot
depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual devel-
opment') (emphasis added) (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 451 (1988)). Moreover, comparing Free Exercise jurisprudence to racial discrimination
and free speech, the majority concluded "that generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have
the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling govern-
mental interest . i.." Id. at 886 n.3 (emphasis added).
57. See id. at 885.
58. Id.
59. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
60. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531.
61. Id. at 520.
62. id.
63. Id.
64. See generally Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. The Court in Lukumi explained the neutrality in-
quiry: "the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. A law lacks
facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from the
language or context." Lukumi. 508 U.S. at 533. Additionally, the Court explained the general appli-
cability inquiry: "inequality results when a legislature decides that the governmental interests it
seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a religious motivation." Id.
at 542-43.
65. Id. at 533 ("[a law] is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly
tailored to advance that interest.").
20041
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erally applicable.66  Further, in applying strict scrutiny, the Court held
that the interests presented by the city failed to justify the ordinance.67
Lukumi provides the logical extension to Smith, applying strict scru-
tiny to a non-neutral law, as might have been anticipated from the Smith
opinion. Once again, in Lukumi, the Court declined to consider the
effect of the law, instead resting its fundamental inquiry on the overall
purpose, or intent, of the challenged law.69 Lukumi demonstrated that the
Court planned to adhere to the doctrine developed in Smith.70  In addi-
tion, Lukumi suggested that the Court was satisfied with avoiding the
effect inquiry of Sherbert, instead focusing on intent and hinging its ap-
plication of strict scrutiny on a neutrality determination.
7'
IV. LOCKE V. DA VEY
72
A. Federal District Court
In January 2000, Davey filed an action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington against Governor Locke
and officials of the HECB, seeking to reinstate his Promise Scholar-
66. Id. at 532.
67. Id. at 547. The city claimed the ordinances "advance[d] two interests: protecting the
public health and preventing cruelty to animals." Id. at 543.
68. See id. at 531-32; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
69. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533. The Court stated "that a law that is neutral and of general
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has an
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice." Id. at 531 (emphasis added). However,
"if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation,
the law is not neutral, and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest ...." Id. at 533
(citations omitted). In his concurring opinion Justice Scalia, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist
joined, voiced his concern for the intent approach that the majority adopted, noting that "it is virtu-
ally impossible to determine the singular 'motive' of a collective legislative body... " Id. at 558.
This concern seems disingenuous because Justice Scalia rid Free Exercise jurisprudence of an effect
inquiry and introduced an intent inquiry in his majority opinion in Smith. See generally Smith, 494
U.S. at 872 (1990).
70. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531.
71. Although this Comment focuses on the Free Exercise Clause, commentators have often
discussed the Establishment Clause in relation to Davey. See, e.g., Carlos S. Montoya, Constitu-
tional Developments, Locke v. Davey and the "Play in the Joints" Between the Religion Clauses, 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1159, 1170-72 (2004); Axtell, supra note 13, at 606-11; Joseph P. Viteritti,
Davey's Plea: Blain, Blair, Witters, and the Protection of Religious Freedom, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 299 (2003). However, because the crux of the issue in Davey is a Free Exercise question and
because the Promise Scholarship Program passes muster under the Establishment Clause, this Com-
ment avoids an exhaustive background of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding a school voucher program that provided tuition
assistance for students to attend either public or private schools where the program is "neutral with
respect to religion" and provides assistance "to a broad class of citizens"); Witters v. Dep't. of Serv.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (upholding vocational assistance for a blind student pursuing a
bible studies degree). Zelman and Witters demonstrate that state sponsorship of a general scholar-
ship that incidentally directs some state funds toward students pursuing devotional theology degrees
is permissible so long as there is an "independent private choice" involved. Zelman, 536 U.S. at
640; Witters, 474 U.S. at 481; see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
(holding that providing an interpreter to a student at a Catholic high school did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause).
72. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
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ship.73 Davey moved for summary judgment, claiming that Washing-
ton's "prohibitions on the use of state funds for religious instruction vio-
late[d] [the right to free exercise of religion] secured by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution ... . The HECB
also moved for summary judgment, arguing that allowing Davey to use
state funds to pursue a degree in devotional theology would violate
Washington's establishment clause,75 and arguing that withdrawal of
Davey's scholarship "did not violate any of Davey's constitutional
rights."76
The court ruled in favor of the HECB on summary judgment, dis-
missing all of Davey's claims for relief.77 Judge Rothstein dismissed
Davey's Free Exercise claim because the HECB had not prohibited
Davey from pursuing a degree in pastoral ministries, and because Davey
had no right to have Washington fund his higher education.78
B. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
On appeal, Davey contended that by singling him out for unfavor-
able treatment by his choice of a religious major, the HECB policy vio-
lated the rules of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah79 and McDaniel v. Paty.80 He argued that a government offering
a benefit may not condition the benefit on the basis of religious status.81
Accordingly, Davey contended that the restriction is subject to strict
scrutiny. 82 Conversely, the HECB contended that strict scrutiny is inap-
plicable because, in refusing to subsidize the education of students pursu-
ing a degree in theology, Washington did not prohibit Davey from freely
practicing his religious beliefs.83 The HECB contended that declining to
finance a right is permissible and that "[tihe focus in free exercise inquir-
ies is on what the government prohibits rather than on what the individ-
ual can exact."84
In determining that the HECB's policy failed the neutrality test and,
thus, was subject to strict scrutiny, the majority first applied an effect
73. Davey v. Locke, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273 (Wash. 2000), rev'd 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir.
2002), rev'd 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
74. Davey, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22273, at *4.
75. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
76. Axtell, supra note 13, at 591.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
80. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
81. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 752 (9th Cir. 2002).
82. Locke, 299 F.3d at 752 ("Washington's restriction may not stand unless it is narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling state interest.").
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxation with Representation
of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988)).
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inquiry and relied heavily on an analogy with McDaniel.85 Applying this
analogy, the court stated that "[a] state law may not offer a benefit to all
... but exclude some on the basis of religion .... 86  The majority ac-
knowledged that Washington is not required to fund the exercise of
Davey's religious rights. 87 However, relying upon Rosenberger v. Rec-
tor & Visitors of University of Virginia,88 the majority analogized
Davey's situation to an abridgement of speech and concluded that the
government's provision of financial benefits must meet the requirement
of viewpoint neutrality, an inquiry reminiscent of the intent test in both
Smith and Lukumi.89 The "bottom line" of viewpoint neutrality "is that
the government may limit the scope of a program that it will fund, but
once it opens a neutral 'forum' (fiscal or physical), with secular criteria,
the benefits may not be denied on account of religion."90 Applying this
"bottom line," the majority determined that the HECB's policy was fa-
cially discriminatory and, thus, subject to strict scrutiny. 9' The majority
held that the Promise Scholarship Program did not pass muster under
strict scrutiny and reversed the lower court's judgment.92
Dissenting, Judge McKeown opined that Washington "neither pro-
hibited nor impaired Davey' s free exercise of his religion. 93 First, Judge
McKeown discussed the intent of the Promise Scholarship and distin-
guished Davey's claim from Lukumi, emphasizing that a constitutional
provision as old as the state itself was far different from a reactionary
city ordinance with likely discriminatory objectives.94 Additionally,
Judge McKeown argued that the majority mischaracterized the Promise
Scholarship Program as viewpoint discrimination. 95 Next, Judge McKe-
own applied an effect test reminiscent of Sherbert v. Verner,96 comparing
85. Id. at 754 (comparing the benefit of holding a public office to the benefit of holding a
Promise Scholarship). See also McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626.
86. Id. The court went on to state: "Washington's restriction disables students majoring in
theology from the benefit of receiving the [Promise] Scholarship just as Tennessee's classification
disabled ministers from the benefit of being a delegate." Id.
87. Id.
88. 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that denial of funding of a student organization that pub-
lished a Christian editorial amounted to viewpoint discrimination).
89. Locke, 299 F.3d at 755-56.
90. id. at 756.
91. Id. at 757-58.
92. Id. at 759-60.
93. Id. at 761 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
94. Id. ("Washington's decision not to fund religious education simply reflects its strong
desire, as reflected in its constitution since ratification in 1889, to insulate itself from the appearance
of endorsing religion-a concern cut from cloth wholly distinct from . . . the city ordinances in
Lukumi."). This discussion by Judge McKeown in the Ninth Circuit foreshadowed the Supreme
Court's introduction of an animus inquiry as the Supreme Court, like Judge McKeown, sought to
distinguish the facts of Davey from Lukumi. See Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
95. Id. at 767 (arguing that "[n]o aspect of [the Promise Scholarship] chills Davey's 'individ-
ual thought and expression') (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 835 (1995)). She further argued that because the Promise Scholarship Program fails to drive
viewpoints from the educational marketplace at Northwest, the majority's viewpoint concerns "are
simply unfounded in this case." Id.
96. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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Davey's financial dilemma with that of an indigent woman seeking an
abortion.97  She noted that the state has no obligation to fund a woman's
right to an abortion, even when it funds other medical procedures. 98 Fol-
lowing this analogy, Judge McKeown concluded that if a state's decision
to not fund an indigent woman's abortion does not substantially burden
her, then Washington has not substantially burdened Davey by refusing
to fund his pastoral ministries degree. 99
C. The United States Supreme Court
Initially, the Court disposed of any Establishment Clause con-
cerns °° and framed the issue as whether Washington can deny the Prom-
ise Scholarship to students preparing for the ministry "without violating
the Free Exercise Clause."' ° Curiously, in light of the intent approach
enunciated in Smith and Lukumi, the Court first distinguished the effect
of Davey from the effect of Lukumi.1 2 Yet, the majority seemed to re-
vert back to the intent test of Smith and Lukumi, resting its holding on a
distinction between the facts of Davey and Lukumi1 °3 The majority ac-
knowledged that Washington treats devotional theology students differ-
ently from students pursuing a secular education; however, it distin-
guished those facts as "[flar from evincing the hostility toward religion
which was manifest in Lukumi .... 104 Because there was nothing in the
history, text or operation of the Promise Scholarship Program that sug-
97. Locke, 299 F.3d at 764-65 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 765 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980)).
99. Locke, 299 F.3d at 765. Similar to the indigent woman in the abortion funding analogy,
Davey's pursuit of his chosen degree is no "more difficult than it would have been in the absence of
[the scholarship] funding." Id.
100. The majority emphasized that "[the Court] ha[s] long said that 'there is room for play in
the joints between [the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause]..' Locke v. Davey, 124
S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2004) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
In the anti-establishment history of the United States, there have been numerous uprisings against
using "taxpayer funds to support church leaders . I..." Id. at 1313. Initially many states sought to
avoid this sensitive issue of established religion and, thus, embodied in their constitutions provisions
against using tax dollars in support of the ministry. Id. at 1314. Some states (such as Washington)
drew a more stringent anti-establishment line in their constitutions than the one drawn by the Estab-
lishment Clause. Id. at 1313. A more stringent state anti-establishment provision is permissible so
long as it does not go so far as to infringe upon rights protected by the Free Exercise Clause. Id.
101. Id. at 1312. The Court declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit's reliance upon viewpoint
neutrality, stating: "[t]he purpose of the Promise Scholarship Program is ... not to 'encourage a
diversity of views from private speakers."' Id. at 1313 n.3 (quoting United States v. Am. Library
Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)). Thus, the speech forum cases are "simply inapplicable." Id. Moreover,
the Court applied "rational-basis scrutiny to [Davey's] equal protection claims," and determined that
Davey's Equal Protection Clause rights were not violated. Id. (citing Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S.
361, 375 (1974); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)).
102. Id. at 1312. The majority emphasized that the policy does not impose criminal or civil
sanctions on the free exercise of religion, it does not interfere with participation in political affairs,
and it does not force students to choose between receiving a government benefit and practicing their
religious beliefs. Id. at 1312-13.
103. Id. at 1313-14.
104. Id. at 1314.
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gested animus toward religion, the majority concluded that the law
should be subjected to a rational-basis test.0 5  Under rational-basis re-
view, Davey's claim failed, and the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
judgment.1
0 6
Dissenting, Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined,'07 ar-
gued for adherence to the plain language of Lukumi, and argued against
the introduction of an animus inquiry that would apply rational-basis to
some non-neutral laws. t°8  He contended that "'[a] law burdening reli-
gious practice that is not neutral ... must undergo the most rigorous of
scrutiny ..... .09 Next, attacking the majority's discussion of the effect
of the Promise Scholarship Program, Justice Scalia argued that there was
no authority for "approving facial discrimination against religion simply
because its material consequences are not severe." 110 Yet, he argued,
even if there was a substantial burden requirement in Free Exercise juris-
prudence, the Promise Scholarship Program has met that threshold."'
Finally, Justice Scalia argued that the Court's animus inquiry will create
a slippery slope of discrimination justifications, stating that "[wihen the
public's freedom of conscience is invoked to justify denial of equal
treatment, benevolent motives shade into indifference and ultimately into
repression.""
2
Thus, the Court in Davey was able to apply a rational-basis test to a
non-neutral law by relying on a new Free Exercise inquiry."3  Con-
versely, Justice Scalia would have continued to apply strict scrutiny to
non-neutral laws, regardless of whether there was evidence of animus.' 
1 4
Whether the majority's new animus test is a much-needed supplement to
105. Id. at 1315. The majority contends that the Promise Scholarship is actually amiable to
religion, noting that the program permits students to attend religious schools and take classes in
devotional theology. Id. at 1314-15.
106. Id. at 1315.
107. Justice Thomas also wrote separately to note that "the study of theology does not neces-
sarily implicate religious devotion or faith." Id. at 1320 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
108. See id. at 1315-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1315-16 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 535 (1993)) (alterations in original). He further argued that "'the minimum requirement of
neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face."' Id. at 1316 (quoting lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533).
110. Id. at 1318. Justice Scalia suggested that he is opposed to considering the effect of a
facially discriminatory law at all. id. He argued that the Court is "[no longer] in the business of
reviewing facially neutral laws that merely happen to burden some individual's religious exercise
.Id. (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
Justice Scalia's critique of the majority's use of a burden analysis is especially interesting consider-
ing that he introduced his dissent with a burden discussion. Id. at 1316. He stated that by "mak[ing]
a public benefit generally available, that benefit becomes part of the baseline against which burdens
on religion are measured; and when [Washington] withholds that benefit from some individuals
solely on the basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise Clause no less than if it had imposed a
special tax." Id.
111. Id. at 1319 (arguing that "when the State exacts a financial penalty of almost $3,000 for
religious exercise-whether by tax or by forfeiture of an otherwise available benefit--religious
practice is anything but free").
112. Id. at 1320.




the Free Exercise doctrine or whether the test is a divergence from the
established doctrine is uncertain. The analysis portion of this Comment
will consider the new animus inquiry and the possible problems with an
animus distinction. Moreover, the analysis will discuss the outcome of
Davey and whether it is possible to achieve the doctrinal goals of the
majority without addressing animus at all.
V. ANALYSIS
The effect of Locke v. Davey'15 is to add a guidepost onto the con-
textual continuum of Free Exercise jurisprudence. The factual circum-
stances of Davey fall on the continuum somewhere between the reaction-
ary prohibition of animal sacrifices of Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah'16 and the non-discriminatory criminal statute pro-
hibiting the use of peyote of Employment Division, Department of Hu-
man Resources of Oregon v. Smith.1 17 However, because the facts of
Davey forge a middle-ground between the poles of the existing doctrine,
the majority created an additional inquiry--declining to apply strict scru-
tiny to a non-neutral law, as might have been anticipated from the doc-
trine developed in Lukumi.118 Instead, the majority limited its application
of strict scrutiny to those laws evincing animus toward religion." 9 This
limitation of strict scrutiny effectively expanded the use of a rational-
basis test to cover facially discriminatory laws evincing no animus, as
well as neutral laws.'
20
Prior to Davey, Free Exercise jurisprudence relied fundamentally on
an intent inquiry, as outlined in Smith and Lukumi.' 21 This inquiry
sought to place a challenged law into one of two categories: neutral or
non-neutral, with little regard to the effects of the law on religious prac-
tice. 12 2 On its face, the Davey Court split the existing non-neutral cate-
gory into two subcategories-applying strict scrutiny where there is evi-
dence of animus but applying a rational-basis test to facially discrimina-
tory laws that evince no animus toward the free exercise of religion.
123
Thus, the Free Exercise doctrine after Davey seems to focus on intent,
seeking to place a law into one of three categories: (1) neutral laws of
general applicability ("neutral"); (2) facially discriminatory laws that fall
115. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
116. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
117. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1309-11; see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 526-
28; Smith, 494 U.S. at 874-75.
118. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533 (applying strict scrutiny to a non-neutral law). Because the
Promise Scholarship Program is non-neutral, a strict adherence to the Lukumi doctrine would apply
strict scrutiny. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312 (rejecting Davey's contention that the law is presump-
tively unconstitutional but declining to reject Davey's argument that the law is not facially neutral).
119. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1314-15; see also Montoya, supra note 71, at 1173.
120. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1314-15.
121. See supra notes 56, 69.
122. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532.
123. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1314-15 (distinguishing the discriminatory intent of the Promise
Scholarship from the animus demonstrated in Lukumi).
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short of evincing animus toward religion ("non-animus discrimination");
(3) laws that demonstrate a hostility toward religion ("animus"). How-
ever, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas condemned the majority's dis-
tinction between non-animus discrimination and animus. 124 Rather, the
dissent would have subjected the Promise Scholarship Program to strict
scrutiny because the law was not facially neutral.
125
The introduction of an animus test in Davey does not necessarily
limit the doctrine developed in Smith and Lukumi. 126 Instead, Davey
serves to supplement the doctrine, presenting an appropriate standard of
review for a factual middle-ground. After Davey, a neutral law of gen-
eral applicability will be subjected to a rational-basis review, as in
Smith.127 Moreover, a reactionary law directed at prohibiting the activi-
ties of a religious group will continue to be subjected to strict scrutiny, as
in Lukumi.12 8 Thus, instead of destroying the doctrine of Smith and Lu-
kumi,129 Davey elucidated a distinct standard of review for non-animus
discriminatory provisions, applying a rational-basis review to a law that
"goes a long way toward including religion in its benefits. 1 30
Although the majority purported to rest its holding on this intent
characterization, some of the discussion in the majority
1 3 and dissent132
suggested that effect considerations were key to the outcome of Davey.
Below, this analysis argues that: (1) Davey represents a resuscitation of
an effect test similar to Sherbert133 that, when combined with the intent
test introduced in Smith, will provide a comprehensive Free Exercise
doctrine; (2) the animus distinction introduced in Davey may be prob-
lematic as a doctrinal tool; and (3) the animus distinction is unnecessary
because the outcome of Davey hinges on an effect consideration.
A. Conceptual Categories of Free Exercise Challenges
To demonstrate the tools necessary for a comprehensive Free Exer-
cise doctrine, it is helpful to consider the six conceptual categories of
Free Exercise challenges. These categories are: (1) neutral without sub-
stantial burden; (2) neutral with substantial burden; (3) non-animus dis-
124. Id. at 1315-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia reiterates language from Lukumi,
stating that "[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral.., must undergo the most rigor-
ous of scrutiny," and noting that "the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discrimi-
nate on its face." Id. (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533, 546).
125. Id. at 1315-21.
126. See Montoya, supra note 71, at 1172 (contending that the use of precedent by the majority
was "'nothing short of bizarre,' and borders on the disingenuous").
127. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885, 888.
128. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
129. See Montoya, supra note 71, at 1172.
130. Davey, 124 U.S. at 1314.
131. See id. at 1312-13 (discussing the insubstantiality of the burden imposed on Joshua Davey
by the Promise Scholarship Program).
132. See id. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is a substantial burden on religion to
withhold a generally available public benefit "solely on the basis of religion").
133. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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crimination without substantial burden; (4) non-animus discrimination
with substantial burden; (5) animus without substantial burden; and (6)
animus with substantial burden. The Court's modem Free Exercise
precedent provides some guidance for applying the appropriate standard
of review to each of these categories. Smith addressed a neutral law hav-
ing a substantial burden on religion, applying a rational-basis review to
Category 2.134 Lukumi applied strict scrutiny to Category 6, a law evinc-
ing animus toward religion that imposed a substantial burden. 135 Finally,
the majority placed the facts of Davey into Category 3 and applied ra-
tional-basis review to a non-animus discriminatory law where there was
no substantial burden on religion. 36 The context provided by modern
Free Exercise precedent provides a good baseline for discussion of the
appropriate standard of review for the remaining three conceptual cate-
gories--Categories 1, 4 and 5.
1. Neutral without substantial burden
Although this category does not precisely align with the circum-
stances presented in Smith,137 consideration of that case is insightful. If a
rational-basis review is appropriate for a neutral law imposing a substan-
tial burden on religion, the logical extension of that doctrine is that ra-
tional-basis would also be appropriate for a neutral law imposing no sub-
stantial burden. Thus, the standard of review applicable to Category 1 is
rational-basis review.
2. Neutral with substantial burden
As noted above, Smith addressed this situation. 38 Thus, the appro-
priate standard of review for this category is rational-basis review.
3. Non-animus discrimination without substantial burden
The majority suggested that the facts of Davey fit into this category,
rather than Category 4, in their discussion of the effect of the Promise
Scholarship Program.1 39 Seemingly discussing substantial burden, the
majority observed that "[the Promise Scholarship Program] imposes nei-
ther criminal nor civil sanctions .... Moreover, the majority stated
that "[iut does not deny ... the right to participate in the political affairs
of the community."' 14' Finally, the majority asserted that the scholarship
"does not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and
134. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885, 888.
135. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
136. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1314-15.
137. See supra Part m.C. and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 134.
139. See Davey, 124 U.S. at 1312-13.
140. Id. at 1312 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993)).
141. Id. (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)).
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receiving a government benefit."'' 42  Apparently concluding that the
Promise Scholarship imposed no substantial burden on religion, the ma-
jority noted that "[Washington] has merely chosen not to fund a distinct
category of instruction."'' 43 Thus, the holding in Davey demonstrates that
a rational-basis review is the appropriate standard for this conceptual
category. 144
4. Non-animus discrimination with substantial burden
Unlike the conceptual categories of Free Exercise reviewed thus far,
this category proves problematic. Initially it seems valid to presume that
a rational-basis review should be applied to this category because the
Court's holding in Davey applied rational-basis to a non-animus dis-
criminatory law. This presumption is well-founded because in modem
Free Exercise jurisprudence, the Court has gone to great lengths to dis-
pose of the residual substantial burden inquiry from Sherbert.14  Thus,
without an effect inquiry, the appropriate standard of review should stem
from an intent categorization as in Smith, Lukumi, and, arguably, Davey.
However, as discussed in Category 3, the Davey majority analo-
gized the effect of the Promise Scholarship Program with the effect of
pre-Smith Free Exercise precedent. 146 This extensive discussion seems to
be more than inconsequential dicta.' 47 Rather, the effect considerations
were likely demonstrative of a fundamental inquiry, dispositive of the
outcome of Davey. Although the Court stopped short of expressly advo-
cating a reintroduction of a Sherbert-like effect analysis, Justice Scalia
acknowledged the subtlety introduced by the majority's effect discus-
sion.
141
After briefly objecting to the animus distinction introduced by the
majority, Justice Scalia embarked on an effect discussion of the Promise
Scholarship Program. 149 He argued that Washington had substantially
burdened Joshua Davey by denying him a generally available public
benefit on the basis of religion. 50  Later in his dissent, Justice Scalia
again suggested that the Promise Scholarship Program imposed a sub-
stantial burden on religion, stating: "[tihe indignity of being singled out
for special burdens on the basis of one's religious calling ... can never
142. Id. at 1312-13 (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136
(1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
143. Davey, 124 U.S. at 1313.
144. See id. at 1315.
145. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (declining "to breathe into Sherbert [any] life beyond the unem-
ployment compensation field .... "). Along with limiting Sherbert, the majority in Smith suggests
that effect should be ignored altogether. See id.; see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
146. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312-13.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 1318 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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be dismissed as insubstantial.' 151 Next, Justice Scalia argued that a sub-
stantial burden consideration was misplaced in Free Exercise challenges
because other forms of discrimination require no proof of substantial
burden. 52  Finally, Justice Scalia argued that if there was such a re-
quirement, Joshua Davey had been substantially burdened because of the
$3,000 financial penalty imposed by the Promise Scholarship Program.153
This tension over substantial burden plausibly demonstrates that the
majority considered an effect inquiry fundamental to the doctrine devel-
oped in Davey. At the very least, the majority limited its holding in
Davey to non-animus discriminatory provisions that fail to substantially
burden religion. It would be beyond the scope of the majority's opinion
to suggest that substantial burden is inconsequential and that a rational-
basis review should be applied to all non-animus discriminatory laws.
The majority's limitation suggests that they would have decided Davey
differently had the substantial burden inquiry returned a different result.
Because the outcome of Davey likely hinged upon a determination of
substantial burden, where there is substantial burden and non-animus
discrimination, strict scrutiny should be applied.
5. Animus without substantial burden
This conceptual category consists of laws evincing animus toward
religion that fail to effectively impose a substantial burden. At first
glance, it would seem that this form of ineffectual bigotry should be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny because the law targets religion. Yet, analogizing
this situation with Equal Protection jurisprudence, it is evident that a
rational-basis review would be sufficient to strike down an ineffectual
bigotry provision. For instance, in Romer v. Evans,154 the Court demon-
strated the effect of a rational-basis review of a law evincing animus."'
The Court stated that "[b]y requiring that [a discriminatory classification]
bear a rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative
end, we ensure that classifications are not drawn for the purpose of dis-
advantaging [a group of people].' 156 Similarly, ineffectual bigotry in the
Free Exercise arena would fail to demonstrate any relationship to a le-
gitimate legislative purpose.1
7
151. Id. at 1318-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 1319 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He noted that "[t]he Court has not required proof of
'substantial' concrete harm with other forms of discrimination.., and it should not do so here." Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976)).
153. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
155. Evans, 517 U.S. at 633; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating a
homosexual sodomy prohibition because the statute failed to further a legitimate state interest under
a Due Process challenge).
156. Evans, 517 U.S. at 633 (citing R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,181 (1980)).
157. See id.
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Moreover, applying a textual analysis, it could be argued that inef-
fectual bigotry is beyond the scope of the Free Exercise Clause. 58 Jus-
tice Scalia made this argument in his concurring opinion in Lukumi, con-
tending that the Court is not "in the business of invalidating laws by rea-
son of the evil motives of their authors."' 159 Because strict scrutiny might
be inconsistent with a textual interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause
and because a rational-basis review is sufficient to invalidate ineffectual
bigotry, the appropriate standard of review for Category 5 is likely ra-
tional-basis review.
6. Animus with substantial burden
As noted in the introduction of this analysis, this conceptual cate-
gory was accounted for in Lukumi.t60 The appropriate standard of review
for Category 6 is strict scrutiny.
B. Resuscitation of Substantial Burden
The above discussion of the six conceptual categories of Free Exer-
cise challenges demonstrates the insufficiency of a doctrine that focuses
strictly on intent. An interpretation of Davey that suggests that an appro-
priate standard of review can be determined by a characterization of neu-
trality, non-animus discrimination, or animus alone ignores a fundamen-
tal inquiry in the opinion. It is beyond the scope of Davey to suggest that
rational-basis review is appropriate for all non-animus discriminatory
laws, even laws that impose a substantial burden on religion. Quite the
contrary, the Court limited its holding, noting the insubstantial burden
imposed by the Promise Scholarship Program.16 1 In doing so, the Court
demonstrated the necessity of a substantial burden inquiry in Free Exer-
cise jurisprudence and strongly suggested that the result of the inquiry
was outcome-determinative in Davey.
162
On the other hand, a doctrine that attempts to determine an appro-
priate standard of review based entirely on an effect inquiry is equally
insufficient. This approach would altogether ignore Smith, once again
applying strict scrutiny wherever there is a substantial burden, reversing
the exception for neutral laws. 163 A strictly effect inquiry was also be-
yond the scope of the majority opinion in Davey. Had the majority in-
tended to completely rid Free Exercise jurisprudence of an intent inquiry,
its discussion of Lukumi would have been superfluous and misleading
158. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 558-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the First Amendment
refers to the effects of laws rather than the "purposes for which legislators enact laws").
159. Id. at 558 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, "[hiad the [lawmakers] set out resolutely to
suppress the practices of [a religious group], but ineptly adopted ordinances that failed to do so, I do
not see how those laws could be said to 'prohibit the free exercise' of religion." Id. at 558-59.
160. See supra note 135.
161. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312-13.
162. See id.
163. See Smith. 494 U.S. at 885. 888.
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dicta.' 64 Instead, the Davey opinion indicates a two-prong Free Exercise
approach.165 First, the majority distinguishes the factual middle-ground
of Davey from its intent inquiry precedent and creates a new category,
allowing a rational-basis review for a non-animus discriminatory law.
166
Second, and of equal importance, the majority gave a breath of life to an
effect inquiry reminiscent of Sherbert167 and limited its holding to a law
that imposes no substantial burden on religion. 1
68
C. Potential Pitfalls of an Animus Inquiry
The Court in Davey was clear that a rational-basis review is avail-
able, even to non-neutral laws, so long as there is no animus and no sub-
stantial burden. 169  The animus inquiry was useful to distinguish the
Promise Scholarship Program in Davey from the reactionary prohibition
on animal sacrifices in Lukumi. 70  Yet, whether an animus inquiry will
be useful as a doctrinal tool in future Free Exercise challenges is uncer-
tain. To demonstrate the potential problems associated with an animus
distinction, it is helpful to consider Equal Protection jurisprudence,
where pursuing an animus inquiry produces some surprising results.
In the Equal Protection arena, it has been argued that the relevant
intent should be the "intent to discriminate, [rather than] the intent to
harm."' 171 The most notable and convincing argument against animus in
Equal Protection "is that [an animus distinction] cannot account even for
[past Equal Protection precedent]."' 72 For instance, in race discrimina-
tion, it could be argued that the drafters of segregation laws failed to
demonstrate animus toward African-Americans. Perhaps the drafters
desired to promote social stability, or held a sincere, albeit misguided,
belief that segregation aided African-Americans.1 74 Even if they recog-
nized the harmful effects of discrimination, perhaps they considered the
164. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1314.
165. See id. at 1312-15.
166. See id. at 1314-15.
167. See supra Part ll.A; see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
168. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312-13.
169. See id. at 1312-15.
170. See id. at 1314 (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 520).
171. See David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
935, 962-64 (1989). Strauss contends that a discriminatory intent standard, much less the narrower
malice approach, is inadequate "as a comprehensive account of discrimination." Id. at 1014. In-
stead, to provide an adequate account of discrimination, the Court must consider some effect inquir-
ies, in addition to the intent inquiry of discriminatory intent. Id. The government should not be
"free to undervalue the interests of a class of citizens, to treat them with indifference, to ignore the
burdens it imposes on them, so long as it does so in order to achieve an objective other than injuring
the group." Id. at 963. Under an animus approach, "[n]o matter how little weight the government
accords to the interest of a class of its citizens, it acts properly so long as it does not set out to inflict
injury on them." id.
172. Id. at 964; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
173. Strauss, supra note 171, at 964.
174. Id
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effects "a regrettable byproduct of a system that was the best for society
as a whole."1 75  None of the aforementioned hypothetical situations
would have amounted to animus. 176 However, in the context of race dis-
crimination, it would be unacceptable to allow discriminatory segrega-
tion, regardless of whether the discrimination reached the threshold of
animus.
1 77
In the area of sex discrimination, the inadequacy of an animus in-
quiry is even more apparent.1 78 In many instances, people not intending
to harm women may have promoted sex discrimination. 179 Some may
have thought that women enjoyed and benefited from their traditional
roles; others may have thought that women were harmed as an unfortu-
nate byproduct of a successful system.180 Once again, permitting the
discrimination of women because of misguided benevolence, or at least
misguided discriminatory intent not amounting to animus, would be un-
acceptable. 181 Thus, "[s]ince we cannot assume that overt and covert
segregation and discrimination against [African-Americans] and women
always reflect a desire to harm them, the [animus] definition... will not
always condemn even the kinds of statutes invalidated in [segregation
and discrimination precedent]."' 82
Considering that an animus inquiry presents such complex problems
in Equal Protection, it is questionable whether animus will be useful as a
doctrinal tool in Free Exercise. The usefulness of animus in Free Exer-
cise jurisprudence will be determined by its application to future chal-
lenges. To survive as a doctrinal tool, animus must provide a meaningful
distinction and account for all Free Exercise discrimination, instead of
being rendered impotent by inadequacy as it was in Equal Protection. In
any event, an animus inquiry alone, without a supplemental considera-
tion of substantial burden, fails to provide "a comprehensive account of
[Free Exercise] discrimination."
183
D. The Animus Distinction is Unnecessary
Although the majority in Davey was successful at creating a com-
prehensive two-prong approach to Free Exercise challenges, a careful
consideration of the six conceptual categories provides a useful tool.









183. Id. at 1014.
184. Category 3 represents non-animus discrimination without substantial burden. See supra
Part V.A.3.
185. Category 5 represents animus without substantial burden. See supra Part V.A.5.
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as do Categories 4186 and 6.187 This commonality demonstrates that the
animus inquiry introduced in Davey is unnecessary to achieve the doc-
trinal results of the majority. For non-animus discriminatory laws, a
rational-basis review should be applied where there is no substantial bur-
den (Davey),188 and strict scrutiny should be applied where there is sub-
stantial burden. 89 Similarly, for laws evincing animus toward religion,
strict scrutiny should be applied where there is substantial burden (Lu-
kumi), 190 and a rational-basis review should be applied where there is no
substantial burden on religion.' 9' In light of the potentially problematic
nature of an animus inquiry, this discovery uncovers a useful doctrinal
approach. A comprehensive Free Exercise doctrine could have been
developed without introducing animus at all. Perhaps the Court should
have explicitly endorsed the resuscitation of substantial burden and com-
bined that inquiry with the intent inquiry of Smith, to create an approach
that could have avoided unnecessarily exposing the complexities of ani-
mus.
For the sake of discussion, this Comment will name the proposed
approach the "intent/effect" test. The first prong of the intent/effect test
will focus on the intent inquiry from Smith and Lukumi.192 This prong
will consider whether the challenged provision is neutral. If the law is
neutral, a rational-basis review will be applied, just as in Smith, and no
further inquires will be required. 93 However, if the law is non-neutral,
the second prong of the intent/effect test will be invoked to determine the
appropriate standard of review. The effect inquiry will consider whether
the challenged law substantially burdens religion. This prong of the in-
tent/effect test will act much like the doctrine developed in Sherbert
94
and discussed in Davey.195 On the one hand, if a non-neutral law sub-
stantially burdens religion, the provision will be subject to strict scrutiny,
as in Lukumi. 196 On the other hand, if a non-neutral law does not sub-
stantially burden religion, the provision will be subject to a rational-basis
review, as in Davey.197 By considering both intent and effect, the pro-
posed two-prong test provides a comprehensive doctrinal approach to
Free Exercise challenges without consideration of an animus distinction.
186. Category 4 represents non-animus discrimination with substantial burden. See supra Part
V.A.4.
187. Category 6 represents animus with substantial burden. See supra Part V.A.6.
188. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1315.
189. See supra Part V.A.4.
190. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
191. See supra Part V.A.5.
192. See supra Part III.C-D; see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 885, 888; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
193. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885, 888.
194. See supra Part HIA; see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
195. See supra Part 1V.C; see also Davey, 124 U.S. at 1312-13.
196. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
197. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312-13.
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Far from a reversion to the doctrine of Sherbert, the intent/effect
test incorporates the modem intent inquiry developed in Smith and Lu-
kumi as the first prong to a comprehensive approach. 98 Nor does the
intent/effect test strictly adhere to the doctrine of Smith and Lukumi, ig-
noring effect.' 99 Instead, the proposed doctrine applies a substantial bur-
den inquiry as its second prong, determining the appropriate standard of
review for non-neutral provisions.
E. Application of the Intent/Effect Test to the Facts of Davey
For the purposes of demonstration, this discussion will walk
through the two-prong approach of the intent/effect test as applied to the
facts of Davey. This proposed test provides a coherent approach to ad-
dressing future Free Exercise challenges.
1. Intent inquiry
The first prong of the intent/effect test is an intent inquiry, as in
Smith and Lukumi, which distinguishes between neutral and non-neutral
laws.2°° The Promise Scholarship Program, as acknowledged by the ma-
jority and argued by the dissent in Davey, is facially non-neutral toward
religion.2 0 ' A program that withholds scholarship funds from students on
the basis of their religious educational preference is far from the general
non-discriminatory ban on peyote use in Smith. 2  Had the Promise
Scholarship Program passed a neutrality inquiry under the first prong of
the intent/effect test, no further inquiries would be necessary. A rational-
basis review would apply to a neutral law, regardless of whether the law
imposed a substantial burden on religion, just as in Smith.2 °3 However,
because the Promise Scholarship Program failed a neutrality inquiry, it
must be subjected to the second prong of the intent/effect test to deter-
mine an appropriate standard of review.
2. Effect inquiry
Because the Promise Scholarship Program is non-neutral, an effect
inquiry is necessary to determine the appropriate standard of review.
This second prong of the intent/effect test will determine whether the law
imposes a substantial burden on religion. If there is a substantial burden,
.204as in Lukumi, strict scrutiny is applied. Where there is no substantial
201
burden, a rational-basis review is applied.
198. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885, 888; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
199. See supra notes 56, 69.
200. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885, 888; Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
201. See Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1314-16.
202. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
203. See id. at 885, 888.
204. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
205. See generally Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1307.
[Vol. 82:2
FREE EXERCISE
Whether a denial of $3,000 in scholarship funds to students pursu-
ing degrees in devotional theology constitutes a substantial burden on
religion is not obvious. On the one hand, as the Davey majority articu-
lated, denial of funding for higher education is dissimilar to those provi-
sions in Lukumi and McDaniel v. Paty206 that imposed a substantial bur-
207den. On the other hand, as Justice Scalia argued in the dissent, the
denial of scholarship funds could be construed as imposing a special tax
208on religion. Because analysis of Free Exercise precedent provides
little in the form of a guiding context here, it is helpful to consider other
areas of constitutional law.
The precedent most analogous to Davey is the state-funding of abor-
tion services. 20 9 Much as it is a violation to substantially burden the free
exercise of religion with a non-neutral law, "the Constitution 'protects
the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy., 21 0  As articulated in Judge
McKeown's Ninth Circuit dissent, the abortion funding cases hold that
denial of funding for an abortion does not amount to an "unduly burden-
some interference" with a woman's Constitutional right to have an abor-
tion.2 1 Rather, the cases suggest that a state is free to fund medical pro-
cedures such as childbirth while it chooses to deny funding to abortion.212
This holds true even where the woman is indigent and the funding policy
effectively leaves her with "no choice in terms of exercise of her consti-
tutional right.,
213
In abortion funding cases, "a woman has a constitutionally-
protected right to an abortion, but the state has no obligation to fund that
206. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
207. Davey, 124 S. Ct. at 1312-13.
208. Id. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 764 (9th Cir. 2002) (McKeown, J., dissenting), rev'd, 124
S. Ct. 1307 (2004); see generally Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980). School voucher case law provides a consideration of funding decisions within the
Religion Clause arena. However, because the crux of the school voucher program involves consid-
eration of the Establishment Clause and because Davey hinges upon a Free Exercise analysis, school
vouchers are probably not the most helpful analogy. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639
(2002) (holding that an Ohio school voucher program was not a violation of the Establishment
Clause).
210. Locke, 229 F.3d at 765 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74).
211. Id. at 764-65; see also Maher, 432 U.S. at 473-74; Harris, 448 U.S. at 316; Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
212. See Locke, 229 F.3d at 765 (McKeown, J., dissenting).
The [state regulation prohibiting abortion funding] places no obstacles absolute or other-
wise in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires an
abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of [the state's] decision to fund child-
birth; she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the service she de-
sires. The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative, thereby influenc-
ing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that
was not already there. The indigency that may make it difficult and in some cases, per-
haps, impossible for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way af-
fected by the [state's] regulation.
Id. (McKeown, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
213. Id. at 764.
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right, even when it has chosen to fund other medical procedures."
21 4
Similarly, Joshua Davey has a constitutionally protected right to the free
exercise of religion.2 15 However, by creating a generally available state
scholarship that is not available to devotional theology students, the state
of Washington has not violated that right because, arguably, the state has
no obligation to fund it.216 Even if Washington made the pursuit of a
non-theology degree more attractive, applying the analogy from abortion
funding case law, it has not made Joshua Davey's situation any more
difficult than it would have been had the state chosen not to provide a
217scholarship at all.
This analogy demonstrates that denial of a scholarship to students
pursuing degrees in devotional theology was not a substantial burden on
their free exercise of religion because: (1) Washington had no obligation
to fund their pursuit; and (2) the Promise Scholarship Program did not
make attaining the degree in devotional theology any more difficult.
Finding no substantial burden, the second prong of the intent/effect test
applies a rational-basis review, even where the law is non-neutral. This
result is consistent with the outcome of Davey. Applying the proposed
intent/effect test to the facts of Davey illustrates that there is a compre-
hensive approach available in Free Exercise jurisprudence that avoids the
precarious animus distinction altogether.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Davey decision provides Free Exercise doctrine with a distinct
standard of review for a contextual middle-ground between Smith and
Lukumi. On its face, this new doctrine maintains the modem tradition of
focusing on the intent of the provision and ignoring the burden it imposes
on religion. Davey accomplishes this result by creating an animus dis-
tinction, distinguishing benign discriminatory provisions from those
evincing animus toward religion.
Yet, a deeper analysis of Davey suggests that there was an intense
debate between a doctrine that reintroduced a substantial burden inquiry
and a doctrine that continued to focus strictly on intent. Along with cre-
ating an animus distinction, the majority seemingly reintroduced substan-
tial burden as a supplement to its intent-focused doctrine. This resuscita-
tion of substantial burden was a necessary addition because the intent
doctrine alone failed to account for all forms of Free Exercise
discrimination.
Despite the apparent utility of animus in Davey, the distinction is
both potentially problematic and unnecessary as a doctrinal tool. Ani-
214. Id.
215. Id. at 764.
216. Id. at 764-65.
217 Id at 765.
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mus is potentially problematic because it is uncertain that animus is actu-
ally required for a law to be invalidated as a violation of the Free Exer-
cise Clause. As in Equal Protection jurisprudence, there may be situa-
tions in Free Exercise where an unacceptable law falls short of evincing
animus; this remains to be seen. Moreover, the animus distinction is
unnecessary because the standard of review for both non-animus dis-
crimination and animus hinges on substantial burden.
The Free Exercise approach proposed by this Comment circumvents
an animus inquiry altogether, instead focusing on neutrality and substan-
tial burden. The intent/effect test first applies a rational-basis review to
neutral laws, applying the doctrine developed in Smith. Non-neutral laws
will be subjected to an effect inquiry under the intent/effect test and strict
scrutiny will be applied where a substantial burden exists. This proposed
approach accounts for all of the six conceptual categories of Free Exer-
cise challenges and applies the appropriate standard of review to each.
The two-prong test accomplishes the doctrinal objectives of Davey with-
out applying a potentially problematic animus distinction.
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